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ABSTRACT
Recommender systems are personalized information systems. How-
ever, in many settings, the end-user of the recommendations is not
the only party whose needs must be represented in recommenda-
tion generation. Incorporating this insight gives rise to the notion
of multistakeholder recommendation, in which the interests of mul-
tiple parties are represented in recommendation algorithms and
evaluation. In this paper, we identify patterns of stakeholder utility
that characterize different multistakeholder recommendation appli-
cations, and provide a taxonomy of the different possible systems,
only some of which have currently been implemented.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recommender systems provide personalized information access,
supporting e-commerce, social media and other applications where
the volume of content would otherwise be overwhelming for users.
They have become indispensable tools of the Internet age, found in
systems of many kinds.
One of the defining characteristics of recommender systems is
personalization. Recommender systems are typically evaluated on
their ability to provide items that satisfy the needs and interests
of the end user, and to do so in a way that recognizes the unique
tastes and needs of each. However, there is increasing recognition
that the receiver of the recommendation is not the sole party of
interest in recommendation generation.
This phenomenon was first recognized in person-to-person rec-
ommendation, where the recommendations are pointers to other
users, as in online dating. In such reciprocal recommendation sce-
narios, it makes sense to recommend person B to person A, only
if it is likely that person B will also be interested in making that
connection [24, 34]. Otherwise, it would be a waste of person A’s
time and attention to receive such a recommendation. Reciprocal
recommendation arises naturally in a number of other contexts,
including job seeking [27], peer-to-peer “sharing economy” recom-
mendation (such as AirBnB, Uber and others), on-line advertising
[16], and scientific collaboration [21, 33].
To these considerations, we also add the concerns of the plat-
form itself. In e-commerce settings, the recommender system is
often seen as an extension of a site’s marketing function, and, as
such, business considerations may enter into the generation and
display of recommendations. In other settings, such as employment
or housing, equity considerations may enter into the provision
of recommendations to users, making it desirable to achieve fair
recommendation outcomes [9, 35]. For example, an educational
recommender may have pedagogical goals in linking students with
experiences, and these goals may be quite different from what
students would choose for themselves [7].
Thus, we have argued that recommender systems research needs
to adopt a multistakeholder perspective on system design and eval-
uation: recognizing the needs and concerns of multiple parties
involved in recommendation outcomes [2]. The aim of this paper is
to investigate the different types of multistakeholder recommender
systems that may arise, given different requirements coming from
different stakeholders, and to provide a taxonomy to describe exist-
ing systems and to guide future research.
2 PRIOR RESEARCH
The concept of multistakeholder recommendation builds on three
existing research themes in the recommender systems community
and beyond: (1) the economics of multisided platforms; (2) the
growing interest in multiple objectives for recommender systems,
including such concerns as diversity and serendipity; and, (3) the
application of personalization to specific matching problems, as in
reciprocal recommendation described above.
2.1 Multisided platforms
One way to understand the multistakeholder aspect of recommen-
dation is through the recent emergence of the theory of multisided
platforms [12, 26]. A multisided platform is a system that brings
together individuals participating in a given transaction, reducing
their transactions costs as to make the interaction more profitable
for those involved. A business that creates such a platform can
profit from it, even though, in theory, the parties could engage in
such transactions on their own.
An example, from [13], is the online restaurant reservation site
OpenTable1. It is a two-sided platform for users to find restaurants
with available reservations and restaurants to present themselves
to users looking for dining spots. OpenTable doesn’t offer collabo-
rative recommendations at present2, but it is easy to envision how
such recommendations could be seen as a simple extension to the
matchmaking function that the site performs.
Adopting a multisided view of the platform in which a recom-
mender system is embedded leads naturally to the idea that rec-
ommender systems themselves must take multiple perspectives
into account in order to be successful. This is not a traditional po-
sition on recommender system evaluation – which has typically
focused on user-oriented objectives, such as accuracy [15]. It could
be argued, however, that industrial recommender systems research,
1www.opentable.com
2By way of recommendations, the site offers a listing of restaurants where the user
has previously booked a reservation.
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with its use of customer lifetime value and other “key performance
indicators”, has already begun to shift to attention away from a
strict focus on the customer’s needs and preferences [5].
One key finding from multisided platform research is that these
platforms are extremely diverse and their structure is governed by
the characteristics of the specific business niche that a platform
fills [13]. Such domain-specific considerations are well-understood
in recommender systems research.
Because of our emphasis on the stakeholders on multiple sides
of a transaction, we are excluding issues of group recommendation
from our discussion in this paper. A group recommender provides
recommendations to a set of consumers, all of whom are on the
same side of the transaction. There are important research issues in
providing recommendations in such contexts, but the multistake-
holder considerations we discuss here are less applicable since the
entire group is on the receiving side of the same recommendation
interaction.
2.2 Multiobjective recommendation
As interest has grown both in reciprocal recommendation and the
integration of business considerations in recommendation, there
has been an increased level of research into the use of multiple
objectives in recommendation, including [1, 3, 4, 17, 18, 27, 32].
These techniques provide a way to limit the expected loss on one
metric (typically accuracy) while optimizing for another, such as
diversity or coverage.
While most multiobjective recommendation research concen-
trates on maximizing objectives for the end user alone, there are
some examples of systems that incorporate objectives from mul-
tiple stakeholders. For example, [27] combines the perspectives
of recruiters and users at LinkedIn and shows that an integrated
objective yields more fruitful interactions. Research in social net-
work settings has noted that there may be general, system-wide,
benefits to other stakeholders in both person and media content
recommendation, since actions taken by one user may impact the
network as a whole [10, 28].
Another area of recommendation that explicitly takes a mul-
tiobjective perspective is the area of health and lifestyle recom-
mendation. Multiple objectives arise in this area because users’
short-term preferences and their long-term well-being may be in
conflict [20, 25]. In such systems, it is important not to recommend
items that are too distant from the user’s preferences – even if they
would maximize health: for example, a food recommender’s ideal
low-fat diet might be too extreme for a user accustomed to heartier
fare. The goal to be persuasive requires that the user’s immediate
context and preferences be honored [14].
2.3 Personalization for matching
The problem of matching multiple parties under preference con-
straints has a long history in the economics literature. See, for
example, the work of Roth [29–31]. These studies assume that the
algorithm makes all of the matches at once, a setting incompatible
with online systems. The BALANCE algorithm relaxes this require-
ment, implementing online matching in the presence of budgetary
constraints [19]. However, a system that outputs a stable matching
is quite different from one that outputs a personalized ranking and
where we cannot assume that the system has full knowledge of the
user’s preferences.
The concept of multiple stakeholders in recommender systems is
suggested in a number of prior research works. As discussed above,
researchers in reciprocal recommendation appliations such as job
search and online dating, have looked at bi-lateral considerations
to ensure that a recommendation is acceptable to both parties [34].
Similar ideas have appeared in group recommender systems where
the goal is to find recommendation(s) that can maximize the utility
of all users in the group [22].
The field of computational advertising has given considerable
attention to balancing personalization with multistakeholder con-
cerns. Auctions, a well-established technique for balancing the in-
terests of multiple agents in a competitive environment, are widely
used both for search and display advertising [36]. For example, the
AdWords system within the Google search engine ranks bidders by
the product of their bid and a system-determined “quality score”, a
ranking intended to maximize the expected revenue for the search
engine [23].
Advertisers also bid for the opportunity to show display adver-
tising to web users in display auctions [37]. There is a substantial
literature in real-time targeted advertising in which advertisers’
expected revenue and / or available budget are incorporated into
the decision to deliver personalized advertising to a user. See [38]
for an example.
In these advertising settings, the amount of information about
each user is generally quite limited, and privacy considerations
control how much of it can be shared with advertisers. In addition,
the real-time nature of the application and the huge potential user
base makes user-level personalization computationally impractical.
As a result, ad display is personalized only to a very coarse degree
(age and geographic region, for example), if at all.
3 A MULTISTAKEHOLDER TAXONOMY
We have argued that a comprehensive approach to multistake-
holder recommendation should explicitly represent the different
stakeholders in the recommendation process and formalize their
utilities [7, 8]. A utility-oriented approach is sufficiently general
that a wide variety of recommendation scenarios can be represented
including reciprocal recommendation, online budget management,
and others.
One important finding in the economics of multisided platforms
is that different applications require different distributions of util-
ity. In many multisided platforms, there is a “subsidy side” of the
transaction where one set of parties uses the platform at a reduced
cost or no cost [13]. For example, users of OpenTable do not pay
to make reservations; instead, restaurants pay for each reservation
made.
In recommender systems as well, the outcomes of the system
may be biased towards one group of parties for similar reasons. In
addition, the need for personalization may vary across systems. For
example, in an e-commerce site, product suppliers will likely not
care about the characteristics of consumers: as long as products
are recommended to likely buyers, they will be satisfied with the
behavior of the system. Online advertising is different: typically an
ad campaign is targeted towards a particular audience. Therefore, a
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recommended ad placement is only successful if the ad matches the
user’s interests, to the extent they are known, and the user matches
the target audience towards which the campaign is oriented.
In addition to the consumers and providers, the system itself may
or may not have preferences for certain types of matches produced
by recommendations. As a diverse marketplace with a variety of
sellers, the artisan-focused site Etsy is interested in attracting and
keeping sellers as well as buyers. Etsy spends a great deal of effort
supporting and marketing to its sellers3. In such an environment,
nurturing new entrants may be a platform owner priority, and
this consideration might enter into the utility the owner associates
with a set of recommendations, leading it, for example, to prefer
recommendation lists that contain a mix of new and established
sellers over those with only established ones.
We divide the stakeholders of a given recommender system into
three categories: consumersC , providers P , and platform or system
S . The consumers are thosewho receive the recommendations. They
are the individuals whose choice or search problems bring them
to the platform, and who expect recommendations to satisfy those
needs. The providers are those entities that supply or otherwise
stand behind the recommended objects, and gain utility from the
consumer’s choice. The final category is the platform itself, which
has created the recommender system in order to match consumers
with providers and has some means of gaining benefit from doing
so.
3.1 Incorporating utilities
We can classify recommender systems based on how they support
and incorporate the utilities of these stakeholders. A system may
support passive or active interaction (or both). A passive system
provides recommendations unprompted by the user, such as “Rec-
ommended for you” items that are listed on many sites. Active
systems provide recommended items in response to some type of
query or interaction from the user.
We can extend this notion of active vs. passive to providers
as well. A system may allow providers to take an active part in
specifying target consumers, or it may not. In our notation, we will
represent a passive approach with the superscript − and an active
one with the superscript +.
Another distinction has to do with the type of personalization an
application supports. We can characterize personalization in terms
of stakeholder utility. If the system does not attempt to provide
items that maximize a given stakeholder’s utility, we say that the
system is neutral with respect to that stakeholder, and use the
subscript n. For example, an e-commerce site may not consider
the provider when delivering recommendations. If the system is
neutral with respect to the user, we might not be willing to call it a
recommender system, but we can consider it a degenerate case of
non-personalized recommendations – the list of “Most popular” or
“Trending” items on some sites is an example.
The system may attempt to satisfy the needs of the user by offer-
ing recommendations tailored (at least in part) to the preferences
of that stakeholder. This condition is denoted with the subscript p.
When the stakeholder is the consumer, this is the most common
3Etsy’s seller site can be found at https://www.etsy.com/sell
personalized recommendation scenario. When there is personaliza-
tion for both the consumer and the provider, we have the reciprocal
recommendation scenario described above.
3.2 Consumer and provider utilities
Figure 1 shows a taxonomy of different combinations of consumer
and provider utility configurations with examples of unexplored
configurations blank. The rows enumerate the different possibilities
for consumers: passive vs active, and neutral vs personalized. The
columns enumerate the same possibilities for providers. We can
identify each entry with a unique tuple: ⟨C, P⟩ with the appropriate
subscript and superscript.
A passive system that provides items without regard for the util-
ities of the user or provider would be a simple “Most Popular” list:
⟨C−n , P−n ⟩. Adding consumer personalization, we get the standard
e-commerce recommendation scenario, ⟨C−p , P−n ⟩. If the user for-
mulates a query or other prompt to the system, we have an active
system that can also be neutral: just returning answers to the query,
or one that personalizes the search results, as is more and more
common in search engines. These options are represented by tuples
⟨C+n , P−n ⟩ and ⟨C+p , P−n ⟩
If the system is not neutral with respect to the provider, it must
try to match consumers to provider preferences. Such designs are
less common in research and in practice, as indicated by the blank
areas in Figure 1. The typical reciprocal recommendation system is
characterized by the tuple ⟨C−p , P−p ⟩. Here, provider preferences are
gathered through provider actions, for example, accepting offers
made by recommendation consumers – such as an AirBnB host
deciding whether or not to accept a guest.
In the active case, the provider can specify the type of consumer
that is a desirable target. If we do not care about the consumers’
preference, we can offer a list of “Featured items’, selected based on
the providers’ audience choices: ⟨C−n , P−p ⟩. “Promoted posts” within
social media sites are a good example of the second case (⟨C−n , P+p ⟩)
– these are recommendations given to users for whom they are a
good fit, but only if the provider has paid to appeal to those targeted
consumers.
Where users are actively posing a query, we see familiar scenar-
ios from search engine advertising. The placement of such ads also
takes place through a bidding process in which the providers’ bids
and the click likelihood are scored [11]. To the extent that click
likelihood is calculated on a per-user basis, such systems could fall
into either of the active categories, ⟨C+n , P+n ⟩ or ⟨C+p , P+n ⟩4.
The only case that is arguably personalized with respect to the
provider’s utility is found in online display advertising. Here there
is a form of reciprocation in that the ad should be appealing to the
user and the user should be in the defined target audience. Typically,
a vector of demographic features are available on which basis the
targeting decision can be made. Thus, the tuple ⟨C−p , P+p ⟩ would
apply. Real-time auctions are used in which providers are expected
to quantify the utility they expect from a given ad placement [36].
4In some settings, the advertiser may use geo-targeting or otherwise identify the
characteristics of users in their target market. Such cases would be (somewhat weak)
examples of the P+p category.
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Passive	(-) Active	(+)
Pn- Pp- Pn+ Pp+
Passive	(-) Cn- Most	Popular Featured
Items
Cp- Standard Reciprocal Paid	
placement
Online display
advertising
Active	(+) Cn+ Query Search engine	
advertising
Cp+ Personalized
Search
Figure 1: Platform-neutral multistakeholder designs. White areas are unexplored.
3.3 The platform as a stakeholder
As discussed above and consistent with the economics of multiplat-
form systems, we believe it is important to add a third dimension
that takes into account the utility of the platform itself. To do so,
we need a 3-tuple to represent the possible system types: ⟨C, P , S⟩.
All of the examples discussed in Section 3.2 are ones in which
the system is neutral: Sn , neither gaining or losing utility based on
what results are produced or to whom they are shown. This is the
classical model of how recommender systems operate. However, in
many real-world contexts, the system may have some aggregate
utility that is factored into recommendation decisions. Consistent
with our notation above, we will denote this possibility with the
notation Sa , for aggregate. For example, the system may prefer
to recommend high-margin items, all other considerations being
equal, with the aim of having higher average profit per user visit.
Recent research in systems with such ⟨C−p , P−n , Sa⟩ designs include
[6, 18, 39]. A search-oriented example is Google’s “quality score”
discussed above in which the search engine takes the expected
revenue into account in deciding what ad to show, a system that
fits into the ⟨C+n,p , P+n , Sa⟩ category.
Alternatively, the systemmay seek to tailor outcomes specifically
to achieve particular objectives separate from stakeholder utilities
– a situation that we denote with St , for targeted. For example, an
educational site may view the recommendation of learning activi-
ties as a curricular decision and seek to have its recommendations
fit a model of student growth and development [7]. Its utility may
therefore go beyond a simple aggregation of those of the other
stakeholders. This problem also arises when fairness is a considera-
tion in recommendation [9]. For example, consider a recommender
system suggesting job opportunities to job seekers. An operator of
such a system might wish, for example, to ensure that male and
female users with similar qualifications get recommendations of
jobs with similar rank and salary. Such an objective goes beyond a
simple aggregation of job seekers’ utilities.
4 CONCLUSION
These considerations leave us with a complex picture of the multi-
stakeholder recommendation space. There are two basic forms of
personalization: neutral n and personalized p results. These can be
exercised in both passive − and active + recommendation contexts,
and can be applied to both consumers and providers. As shown in
Figure 1, this gives a total of 16 possibilities. If we are interested
in personalized recommendations, the Cn cases are of less interest,
leaving 8 designs, of which really only two have seen substan-
tial attention in recommender systems research: ⟨C−p , P−n , Sn⟩ and
⟨C−p , P−p , Sn⟩.
Furthermore, as we have shown, the platform itself is a stake-
holder. Many platforms are neutral with respect to the recommen-
dation function, with the result that the Sn condition is most fully
explored. However, there is an increasing trend to represent the
system’s own utility in some fashion, typically oriented towards
profit or other performance indicators. Thus, we expect to see addi-
tional exploration of the Sa space in both research and application.
Finally, there are emerging recommendation research agendas in
health, education, and other areas where the platform has its own
strategic considerations to guide recommendation activity and this
is where St designs are beginning to be seen.
Thus, the full set of possibilities for multistakeholder recom-
mender system design is a three-dimensional version of Figure 1,
a 2x4x3 matrix of possibilities (excluding the non-personalized
options), which, except for the Sn subset, has been only lightly
explored. We look forward to future research that will fill these
gaps.
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